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Abstract 
Extant evidence that the self-employed overestimate their returns by more than employees do 
is consistent with two mutually inclusive possibilities. Self-employment may generate 
optimism or optimists may be drawn to self-employment. This paper finds that employees who 
will be self-employed in the future overestimate their short-run financial wellbeing  by more 
than those who never become self-employed. When actually self-employed they are even more 
optimistic. Employees aspiring to start their own business are also of above average 
optimism.  Cross-sectional findings are therefore an amalgam of psychological disposition 
and environmental factors, as theory requires if optimism is to be a causal influence on 
entrepreneurship. 
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"The presumptuous hope of success seems…..to entice so many adventurers into those 
hazardous trades, that their competition reduces their profit below what is sufficient to 
compensate the risk" Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1796), Book 1, Chapter 10. 
 
1. Introduction 
 Most governments encourage entrepreneurship on the assumption that it is 
unequivocally a good thing, promoting market competition, innovation and economic growth. 
For individuals, the attractions of self-employment include personal autonomy, the 
opportunity to take risk for financial reward, life-style flexibility and tax avoidance (e.g. 
Scheinberg and McMillan, 1988; Dennis, 1996; Amit et al., 2001; Douglas and Shepherd, 
2002; Cassar, 2007). If, as Hamilton (2000) finds, the average income of the self-employed is 
lower, or as Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgenson (2004) report, starting a business involves 
higher risk but lower expected returns than for stock market investment, these may be prices 
worth paying. As long as nascent entrepreneurs appreciate the trade-offs, there is no 
particular cause for concern. However, accumulating evidence, reviewed in the next section, 
suggests that the self-employed overestimate their prospects by more than employees do. 
This does not necessarily mean that the choice of self-employment involves error. Those 
selecting self-employment may have an optimistic disposition, in which case they will also 
tend to overestimate their prospects in paid employment. If the returns to both are 
overestimated to the same extent, the choice between employment modes will be the same as 
if expectations are realistic. It is only if individuals are more optimistic about self-
employment than paid-employment that entry will be excessive. As planning and running a 
new business are activities that involve a high perception of self-control and offer few 
barriers to fantasy, they may be breeding grounds for optimism.  
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 This paper seeks to determine the extent to which the relative optimism of the self-
employed reflects their intrinsic psychology or is a side effect of planning and running a new 
business. If intrinsic optimism is a cause of entrepreneurship, not only must entrepreneurs 
have an optimistic disposition, bu being an entrepreneur must also give more scope for 
optimism, as noted by de Meza and Southey (1996) 
 
 To investigate these matters, this paper uses longitudinal data on a large sample of 
individuals in the UK tracked annually since 1991. This data source is rich in the sense that it 
allows sequential observation of financial expectations, financial realizations and transitions 
into and out of self-employment. However, as explained in the paper, the categorical nature 
of the data presents various research challenges. 
 
 The main findings of the paper are that those who will enter self-employment display 
higher than average financial optimism while in paid employment and are even more 
optimistic when self-employed. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the background to the questions, identifies some problematic research issues, and 
proposes strategies to address them. Section 3 describes the longitudinal data source and 
develops the empirical methodology. This is applied in section 4. Section 5 provides final 
discussion and conclusions. An appendix presents alternative empirical approaches. 
 
2. Background and development of research issues 
 
 There is no completely settled definition of an entrepreneur. Someone who starts a 
business that employs others is certainly an entrepreneur. Nevertheless, this is not entirely 
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distinct from what, say, a self-employed literary agent does. In this paper, self-employed 
status is used as an indicator of entrepreneurship. This measure is practical, but may be too 
inclusive. The accountant with a private practice and an office over a shop is not a hero of 
creative destruction, though as Adam Smith said of the family grocer, “He must have all the 
knowledge, in short, that is necessary for a great merchant, which nothing hinders him from 
becoming but the want of sufficient capital.” (Wealth of Nations, Book. 1, Ch. 10). The self-
employed are typically residual income recipients and willingness to embrace this role 
suggests they have much in common with narrower definitions of entrepreneurs. Self-
employment is the most commonly used measure of individual entrepreneurial status where 
researchers rely on secondary analysis of existing data (e.g. Amit et al. (1995), Burke et al. 
(2000), Evans and Leighton (1989), Parker (2009) Puri and Robinson (2007), Taylor (1996), 
Van Praag and Cramer (2001)). While recognising the limitations, ‘self-employed’ and 
‘entrepreneur’ are used interchangeably in the discussion. 
 
 One characteristic of entrepreneurs for which there is accumulating evidence is that 
they overestimate the financial returns to starting a business (see Parker 2009 for a survey). 
For example, Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) find that the mean estimate by 
entrepreneurs of the probability that their own business will survive is well in excess of the 
mean realised probability. According to Landier and Thesmar (2009), entrepreneurs tend to 
overestimate employment expansion and sales growth. These studies do not, however, 
compare the optimism of entrepreneurs with the general population, leaving the question 
open as to whether higher optimism is really an intrinsic characteristic of those whose choose 
self-employment.1 Perhaps optimism is equally the province of those in paid employment. 
																																								 																				
1 Optimism is taken here as forecasts biased in the favorable direction as opposed to overconfidence, interpreted 
as excessive forecast precision. (It is therefore logically possible to be an overconfident pessimist.). Hvide 
(2002) terms what we define as optimism, overconfidence, and what we denote as overconfidence, as 
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After all, optimism has been identified as one of the most widespread of behavioural biases 
(De Bondt and Thaler (1995, p. 389)). At first sight, cross-section studies suggest that 
entrepreneurs do indeed have higher levels of optimism. For example, Arabsheibani et al. 
(2000) find that the self-employed overestimate their financial prospects by more than those 
in paid employment. Puri and Robinson (2007, 2009) use subjective longevity estimates to 
measure the relative optimism of the self-employed. Although the self-employed expect to 
live about six months longer than those in paid employment, applying actuarial adjustments 
for smoking, education and race, they will die eight months sooner on average. So the self-
employed are lifespan optimists..23  
 
 Although thestudies are of considerable interest, they do not address whether the 
observations arise because increased optimism is a consequence of entrepreneurship. Almost 
everyone may think that starting a successful business is more lucrative than it really is.4 On 
this view, optimism is not a characteristic of the type of person attracted by entrepreneurship 
but the creation of the noisy, unpredictable environment, in which the self-employed typically 
operate. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) identify the ‘planning fallacy’, that is 
the tendency of people engaged in complex projects to regard best case scenarios as the most 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
overconfidence., However Parker (2009) is clear that over-optimism refers to over-estimation of the probability 
of success, whereas over-confidence is under-estimation of the degree of variation in outcomes. Busenitz and 
Barney (1987) and Forbes (2005) measure overconfidence by examining the proportion of estimates to trivia 
questions, such as the length of the Nile, that fall outside  self assessed confidence intervals. Business founders 
are more confident than their managers.  
2 No adjustment is made for being an entrepreneur. It is possible entrepreneurs really do live longer. For 
example, Kuper and Marmot (2003) finds that taking orders is bad for life expectancy, a burden avoided by the 
self-employed. In their later paper (2009) Puri and Robinson show comparisons between entrepreneurs and the 
general population, and highlight significant differences in behavior between moderately and extremely 
optimistic entrepreneurs, for example in terms of work effort. 
3 Fraser and Greene (2006), using British data for the period 1984-99, find that the self-employed have higher 
income expectations than employees, but the difference diminishes with experience. Data on income realizations 
are not available in their study, so it is possible that expectation differences are justified. 
4 Astebro (2003) finds inventors have very negative expected returns. Nevertheless, they persist in seeking 
commercialization  even after receiving credible external advice against doing so (Astebro et al., 2007). The 
latter studies also finds inventors score higher on tests of optimistic attitudes than do the general population. 
These results are distinctly interesting, though for present purposes subject to qualification.  Inventors may be 
extreme, forecast errors are not measured and it is possible beliefs are adopted post commitment as   
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likely outcome. Explicit planning actually makes the problem worse, encouraging an ‘insider’ 
view which places greater weight on internal operational activity than on shocks originating 
in the external market. By contrast, ‘outsiders’ place greater weight on typically realised 
performance, perhaps by paying closer attention to external information about actual 
realizations of other entrepreneurs. Consistent with this, Cassar (2010) finds that business 
start-ups which have gone through a formal planning process have the least realistic 
forecasts. Entrepreneurs as insiders in an uncertain environment where illusions of control 
flourish and complex planning is required may be situated in an optimism incubator.  
 
 One way to address the question of whether entrepreneurial optimism is acquired or 
intrinsic is to compare the financial optimism of people in paid employment who never 
become self-employed (hereafter ‘nevers’) with those currently in paid employment who 
subsequently become self-employed (hereafter ‘futures’) those in their last period in wage 
employment (so the forecast is for the first period of self-employment) (‘switchers-in’), and 
those in their last year of self-employment (‘switchers-out’) and if they revert to self-
employment (‘pasts’). These groups further contrast with those currently in a spell of self-
employment which has lasted for one than one year and which will last for at least one further 
year (‘selfs’) Since measurements of forecasts and realizations are taken in a common 
environment, differences should reflect dispositional financial optimism. 
 
 There is though an important qualification to this conclusion. If the transition into 
self-employment is the result of a history of disappointing outcomes in paid employment, 
futures may be recorded as relatively optimistic in the sense that their forecast errors are 
higher than average, but this is the consequence of rational learning (in the spirit of 
Jovanovic, 1982) rather than of heterogeneous psychology. Although rational expectations 
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implies that the expected forecast error is zero irrespective of individual characteristics and 
history, this does not mean that the expected error conditional on future decisions is zero. 
Suppose, for example, that everyone initially enters paid employment believing they will 
most likely earn the average of those with the same educational background and other 
observable characteristics. An individual doing worse faces a signal extraction problem. A 
poor realization could be the consequence of a bad draw or may be because (unobservable) 
intrinsic ability is below average for those with similar observables. If learning is rational, a 
run of poor realizations should lead to a downward revision of the ability prior and hence of 
expectations. It may then be worth trying a different way of earning a living, such as self-
employment. According to this explanation, the prior optimism of futures is associated with 
worse realizations and forecasts that are no better than those of nevers and gradually become 
worse.5 If decision making is rational, post transition into self-employment, the expected 
forecast error would be zero.6  
 
 In summary, if those entering self employment are characterised by greater intrinsic 
optimism, two features should be present. First, those who will be self-employed in the future 
should over forecast their returns relative to those who will never be self-employed. Second, 
if this apparent optimism is not (entirely) due to rational learning, the future self-employed 
should have significantly higher expectations, not just lower realizations. Both of these 
features readily lend themselves to empirical investigation. 
 
																																								 																				
5 An alternative rational learning story is that someone who enjoys a good realization run concludes that they are 
better than average and decides, in the absence of a better paid employment match, to become self-employed as 
returns are more closely attuned to ability. This though implies that futures would be recorded as less optimistic 
than nevers. 
6
 If expectations are rational the unconditional forecast error of those with worse past realizations should be 
zero. In fact the data used in this paper reject this strongly. Furthermore, the unconditional error of those 
entering self employment should be zero. 
8	
	
3. Data source and descriptive analysis 
 
 The data is from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is a nationally 
representative general purpose survey funded by the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council, and similar in structure to the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the German 
Socio-Economic Panel. A stratified random cluster sample of households is drawn from the 
population of British household postal addresses in Great Britain.7 The original sample of 
5000 households (approximately 12000 individuals) was recruited in 1991, and follow-on 
rules are established to track newly forming households involving originally-enumerated 
household members.8 The survey instrument is a questionnaire involving a household section, 
and individual sections, covering a range of topics including economic activity and finances, 
administered to all adult household members (including new household members at each 
wave). Repeat interviews take place annually, with 18 annual waves currently available to 
researchers.  
 
 Self-employment in the UK is defined by tax status – that is, registered with the tax 
authority as an own-account worker or business owner with approval to pay income tax (and 
social security contributions) through an end of year assessment, rather than through the UK 
‘pay-as-you-earn’ (PAYE) system. The BHPS asks individuals to self-report their 
employment status, thus identifying self-employment on this basis. Switchers and futures are 
identified by those who report that their full-time or main economic status changes. 
																																								 																				
7 The far north of Scotland is excluded because of the prohibitive sampling costs. The original survey excludes 
Northern Ireland. Booster samples for Wales and Scotland recruited in 1999 and a sample for Northern Ireland 
recruited in 2001 are excluded from the analysis. 
8 Sample attrition rates in the BHPS are generally low and certainly comparable to those achieved in other 
similar household panels. As is typical with household panels the highest attrition rate of individuals was 
between Waves 1 and 2 (12%). Attrition between Waves 2 and 3 was 7% of the original individuals and 
subsequently averaged 2.4% of the original sample between waves. In common with nearly all previously 
published research using this data source, attrition is assumed to be a random event. 
9	
	
Switchers-in and –out are those who report a transition into or out of self-employment 
between the present and the next year. Futures are those who report further in the future a 
change into self-employment.9 Those who never enter self-employment are identified as 
nevers. 
 
 From Wave 8 of the survey (1998/9) onwards, all economically active adults are 
asked about their entrepreneurial aspirations as part of the following question: 
‘I am going to read out a list of things which you may or may not want to 
happen to your current employment situation. For each one can you please 
tell me whether you would like this to happen to you in the next twelve 
months. Would you like to … start up your own business (a new business)?’ 
Aspires are identified as those currently in paid employment who in the year of forecast 
answer in the affirmative; non-aspires are those who answer in the negative. This question is 
specifically about start-ups so accords with narrow definitions of entrepreneurship. 
	
	 The BHPS allows individual optimism to be investigated by information contained 
within two questions asked of all individuals in each year. These are:  
‘Looking ahead, how do you think you yourself will be financially a year from 
now; better than you are now, worse than you are now, or about the same?’ 
(forecast) 
and 
‘Would you say that you yourself are better off, worse off or about the same 
financially than you were a year ago?’ (realization)  
																																								 																				
9 A small number of transitions into part-time self-employment alongside full-time or part-time paid 
employment are excluded from the futures and switchers groups. 
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Matching the first question asked at year t with the second question asked at year t+1 
provides forecast and the realization of that forecast.  
 
 What subjects understand by being well off financially is not straightforward. A 
further question asks subjects to attribute the main reason for the change. For those with 
improved realisations, 67% report that an earnings increase is the main reason, followed by 
12% who report a fall in outgoings. There is a close match between nevers and futures but for 
selfs only 63% name earnings as the main factor. For those experiencing worse realisations, 
49% report that the reason is higher outgoings, whereas 29% report lower earnings. Again, 
futures and nevers are very similar but 41% of selfs report lower earnings and 35% higher 
outgoings. In judging intrinsic optimism, the source of the change in finances is not obviously 
relevant. In assessing whether experiencing self-employment affects optimism, it is earnings 
changes that really matter. Brown and Taylor (2006) compare responses to these questions 
with real and nominal changes in actual income. The results reassuringly report consistency 
between an individual’s forecasting accuracy and the actual changes in their financial 
situation, and suggest that individual perceptions square with what happens to actual 
finances. 
 
 To the extent the realization report is a noisy measure of income change, it will be 
harder to detect optimism change associated with status transitions. It is not obvious that that 
personal expenses should fluctuate more for the self employed so changes in optimism when 
people move status is likely to reflect changes in their income assessment. As on the upside 
income changes are reported as less important for selfs and on the downside more important. 
This suggests that our subsequent analysis underestimates how optimism changes when 
people become self employed. 
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 Tables 1a and 1b provide descriptive statistics on the BHPS data. Means and standard 
deviations are reported for available individual-year observations on two sample partitions: 
firstly aspires and non-aspires, and secondly futures, switchers-in, selfs, switchers-out, pasts 
and nevers. The financial forecasts of futures exceed the nevers but realizations are rather 
similar. Selfs have higher forecasts than futures but also lower realizations. Aspires have 
higher expectations than non-aspires but also better outcomes. Note that the mean 5-point 
scale forecast error is in the optimistic direction for all groups but non-aspires and nevers are 
the least optimistic by some way, followed by switchers out, pasts, futures, switchers-in, 
aspires, and selfs.10 The rest of the paper investigates whether this optimism ranking can be 
taken at face value.  
 
 The remainder of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for a set of control covariates 
which will be used in the econometric analysis: age, gender, marital status and highest 
education. It is of note that aspires and futures tend to be slightly younger, and that non-
aspires and nevers are much more likely to be female, reflecting the lower proportion of 
women amongst the stock of self-employed in the UK. 
 
 Educational attainment is captured in the analysis through a series of dummy 
variables indicating the highest level of attainment. These are: university or college degree 
level at undergraduate or postgraduate level; other non-degree higher education including 
some historic teaching qualifications and nursing qualifications; A-levels or equivalent (post-
compulsory examinations taken at 18 as qualifying exams for college or university entrance), 
																																								 																				
10 Nevers are identified as never being self-employed during the sample period. Some may enter self-
employment later, in which case the tendency is to under record the extent of the optimism difference with 
futures. 
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GCSE or O-levels (age 16 schooling attainment qualifications); and no formal qualifications. 
Nevers are less likely to have higher educational qualifications. 
 
4. Econometric strategy 
 
 Optimism is self-serving prediction bias. People systematically overestimate how well 
off they will be. A natural procedure to measure whether optimism differs between groups is 
therefore to construct forecast error as the difference between individual expectation and 
realization. Denote !’s forecast at " − 1 of their income at " as %&' and the realization at " as 
(&'. Initially, suppose both are continuous variables.. Defining forecast error as )&' ≡ %&' −
(&'., the rational expectation, %&', satisfies (&' = %&' + -&' where -&' is a random error with 
mean zero reflecting the various shocks that can intervene between the forecast and 
realisation. It therefore follows that	)&' = (%&' − %&') − -&'. Forecast error is an unbiased but 
noisy estimate of optimism. The central test therefore appears to be whether the mean 
forecast error of futures significantly differs from nevers.  
 
In the present context, there are three problems with this procedure; 
i)  Suppose that individuals learn about their productivity over time. Initially, they 
assume that they resemble their peers and so forecast average returns. As 
experience flows in, individuals update their estimate of their intrinsic ability. 
This involves a signal extraction problem. A poor realization may be bad luck or 
reflect low ability so it is rational to downgrade expectations, though by less than 
the shortfall in realizations. Those experiencing a run of poor realizations will 
therefore be recorded as optimists. After a while, they downgrade their expected 
returns in paid employment by so much they try self-employment. On average, 
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futures are therefore measured as optimistic relative to nevers, despite both groups 
being equally rational. The potential problem is that futures are created by 
subsequent forecast error. In effect, the label is awarded for being an optimist. 
This rational learning possibility can though be rejected if futures have 
significantly higher realizations.11 
 
It is worth making the rational learning issue explicit with a stylized illustration. 
Let there be equal numbers of two types of risk-neutral people, As and Bs. If an A 
enters paid employment they earn 100 whereas a B earns 50. In self-employment, 
both types have expected earnings of 60. At the outset people do not know their 
type. Everyone is risk neutral and has rational expectations. A working life 
comprises two periods. In the first, everyone chooses paid-employment in which 
expected earnings are 75, exceeding the 60 in self-employment. As earnings in 
paid-employment reveal type, in the second period all Bs switch to self-
employment and all As remain in paid-employment. When asked to forecast 
income, subjects report expected value.  Measured by forecast error, futures are 
therefore all optimists and nevers are pessimists, despite everyone having rational 
expectations. Come the second round, everyone is a realist.  
 
Note that the problem identified here does not arise with aspires because the 
classification is made simultaneously with the forecast rather than retrospectively. 
  
ii) As realizations may be subject to large idiosyncratic shocks they are noisy 
estimates of bias. Detecting between-group differences in optimism may therefore 
																																								 																				
11 The mirror case is if people do better than average, upgrade their estimate of their ability and then switch to 
self-employment where they believe reward is more closely related to ability. Rational learning of this sort 
makes futures appear relative pessimists but this is not observed in our data. 
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be difficult. There is a better way. Define a new error measure, )1' = %&' − (' 
where (' is the mean realization of the group to which the individual belongs. It 
follows that averaged over the group, )&' equals )1', but the latter has lower 
variance if 234(&' > 2782(&'%&'. This inequality certainly holds if forecasts are 
random or if the variation in realizations is mostly due to random shocks. In 
effect, the )&'	 measure assumes the rational expectation is the actual realization 
and )1' assumes that the appropriate forecast is the group mean. The difference 
does not affect the point estimate of bias but its precision. )1'	is normally the 
appropriate measure if the objective is to detect differences in bias between 
groups. 
 
iii) When the forecast error procedure is applied to categorical data of the BHPS type, 
a potential data truncation bias arises. As in Das and van Soest (1997), 
Arabsheibani et al. (2000) Souleles (2004) and Balasuriya, Muradoglu, and Ayton 
(2010), forecasts and realizations could  be cardinalized on three-point scales from 
which  a five-point measure of forecast error can be constructed. It is then tested 
whether the mean of this measure differs between groups. To illustrate why this 
can give rise to misleading results, suppose that for futures the most likely 
outcome is better, so this is their rational forecast. Nevertheless, because 
outcomes are stochastic, same and worse are sometimes realized. On average, 
futures will therefore be recorded as optimists. Similarly, nevers may rationally 
predict worse in which case they will be measured as pessimists on average. It 
may therefore be falsely concluded that futures are significantly more optimistic 
that nevers despite both having rational expectations. 
 
15	
	
 To avoid these three problems in estimating forecast bias, a two-stage procedure is 
proposed. At the first-stage, a fixed-effect regression is run of realization at " + 1 on time 
varying employment status dummies, past realizations age and year dummies.12 The fitted 
values from this equation are the rational expectations. At the second-stage, forecast at t is 
regressed on the fitted values, employment status (with nevers as the excluded variable), the 
other time varying variables and some time invariant variables of interest. This is a more 
sophisticated version of using the group mean as discussed in ii). The primary interest is in 
the employment status variables.  
 
 A number of specific points should be made concerning this procedure. At the 
second-stage, the role of the fitted values is as a control. If everyone is equally optimistic, all 
those with the same fitted value should make the same forecast, therefore the difference in 
forecast by group measures relative optimism. The problems of categorical data are 
sidestepped. This does not apply to the coefficient on the rational expectation. The only 
restriction imposed by rationality is this coefficient should not be negative.13 
 
 Forecast is not included at the first-stage. Its inclusion potentially creates bias. Say 
that futures have on average lower fixed effects. Also, performance is increasing in 
expectations (as will be true if forecasts have some rationality). It follows by construction 
that at any given level of predicted performance, the nevers must have higher average 
																																								 																				
12 The problems with nonlinear fixed effects models (e.g. Greene (2004)) lead us to use a linear formulation 
albeit that the cardinalization that outcomes involve equal increments is somewhat arbitrary. 
13 Suppose two groups. The best performers have a 40% chance of better 30% same and 30% worse. Their 
expected performance on a 1,0,-1 scale is 0.1. All these rationally forecast better. The worst performers have a 
30% chance of better 30% same and 40% worse. Their expected performance on a 1,0,-1 scale is -0.1 and all 
rationally forecast worse. So a change of 0.2 in performance generates a change in forecast of 2, a coefficient of 
10. If the two groups had chance of better of 40% and 50% performance differs but not forecast, so the 
coefficient would be zero. 
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expectations. At the second stage, the futures would therefore be found to be more optimistic, 
but this is an artefact of the procedure when futures are included at the first-stage.14  
 
 In the case of futures, there is a problem in drawing conclusions concerning their 
relative optimism if this group has lower realisations than nevers (as revealed by the average 
first-stage fixed effects of the groups). Under these circumstances the optimism of the futures 
could be due to rational learning. There are ways round this. If the apparent optimism of 
futures is due to rational learning that their ability is relatively low, inclusion of lagged 
realizations at the first stage should at least in part control for this. People with same history 
should draw the same conclusions about their ability and therefore display the same measured 
optimism even if learning is present. Second, if the optimism of futures is due to learning, 
their expectations should not be significantly higher than nevers. So when testing for the 
relative optimism of futures, the procedure is supplemented with a separate test of 
expectations. If futures are more optimistic according to the two-stage test and their 
expectations are higher, their intrinsic optimism is higher.15 
 
 The Appendix presents alternative methods of estimating differences in optimism and 
discusses their merits and drawbacks. All procedures yield similar conclusions.  
 
5. Results 
 
																																								 																				
14 Adding forecasts to the first stage has negligible effect on its explanatory power and the fitted values. 
15 Separately estimating the expectation and realization equations is more straightforward than using the two-
stage procedure. The problem is if it is impossible to reject that futures or some other optimistic group perform 
better. This issue is further discussed in the Appendix.  
17	
	
 Table 2 reports the first stage of the procedure for the aspires and futures samples. 
These are fixed-effect, linear realization equations. Column (1) compares aspires with non-
aspires and shows that there is no significant difference in the financial realizations of the 
two groups. Column (2) compares groups on the basis on self-employment status and 
transition. Switchers-out have the highest realizations, and the difference is statistically 
significant. They are followed in order by pasts and selfs. In column (2), once we control for 
differences between these groups, we also find that a positive association between previous 
and current realization, as indicated by the negative coefficients on ‘same’ and ‘worse’.16 To 
measure inter group performance differences, the fixed effects are retrieved and regressed on 
the time-invariant group dummies with standard errors bootstrapped. Results for this are 
reported in Table 3. These results show significant differences in dispositional optimism 
between aspires and non-aspires (column 1) and between nevers and other groups who may 
have been self-employed, are self-employed, or may become self-employed (column 2). 
 
 The second-stage expectation regressions, from which optimism conclusions are 
derived, are the first two columns of Table 4 where the rational expectation control is the 
fitted values of the first-stage realization equation.17 Standard errors are bootstrapped and are 
clustered in order to take account of multiple observations per individual. The coefficients on 
the various time-varying and invariant variables measure differential optimism.18 To gauge 
																																								 																				
16 The regressions in Table 2 include a lagged dependent variable, albeit in a categorical form. In panel data, 
where the number of time observations is particularly low, there is the possibility of bias in the coefficient 
estimates. However in the present case the average number of observations per individual is 7. Furthermore the 
purpose of the model in Table 2 is to provide estimates of realizations rather than inference, and to test 
differences in averages between groups. There is no reason to believe that any bias would affect particular 
groups differently. 
17 Alternative specifications such as entering the fitted values in quadratic form to allow for non linear effects, 
the inclusion of interaction terms hardly affect the final optimism estimates, so for ease of interpretation the 
simpler form is reported. 
18 An alternative procedure runs fixed-effects regressions at both stages, retrieves the second stage fixed effects 
and then runs them on the group dummies. This yields very similar results. Finally, a pooled first-stage probit 
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the magnitude of optimism effects, note that on average about a third of forecasts are better. 
Suppose that optimism increaes. Some of those predicting same now forecast better and some 
previously forecasting worse upgrade their forecast to same. Suppose 10% of those not 
already forecasting better change their expectations. The effect of this is to raise the 
expectation measure by approximately 0.066 and the number forecasting better increases by 
some 16%.  
 
 Our primary concern is with differences in optimism between the different sample 
groups. However, before these are discussed, we briefly describe other significant optimism 
effects, revealed in the other covariate coefficient estimates that are incidental to the main 
themes of the paper. Firstly optimism declines with age. Secondly men are significant more 
optimistic than women. This supports previous research (Puri and Robinson, 2007; 
Arabsheibani et al. 2000). Again, although statistically significant, the effect is not large. 
Thirdly being married is associated with lower optimism, supporting previous cross-sectional 
research. The magnitude of this effect is almost exactly the same in size, but with the 
opposite sign, as that for males. So unmarried males are most optimistic; married females are 
least optimistic. Fourthly a higher level of educational attainment is associated with lower 
optimism. Coefficient estimates vary somewhat across the reported specifications. Generally 
speaking someone with a university degree or college diploma (HND/HNC) reports lower 
forecast than someone with no educational qualifications. Lower levels of educational 
attainment are generally not statistically significant. Finally, optimism is higher following a 
good realization in the previous period, as indicated by the significant negative coefficient 
estimates at the foot of the table on the ‘same’ and ‘worse’ realization categories. 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
can be run at the first-stage to generate rational expectation probabilities to be used as controls in a second-stage 
expectation probit. Again, results are similar. 
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 Both second-stage equations show strong evidence that expectations are at least 
qualitatively rational in the sense that those with most reason to have above average forecasts 
according to the first-stage equation, are actually more likely to have higher forecasts.19 
 
 The main focus of the paper involves comparison of optimism by employment status 
and aspirations. From the first column of Table 4, employees who aspire to start a business 
are more optimistic than those who do not. According to the second column of Table 4, 
nevers are significantly less optimistic than all other groups. As futures have significantly 
worse realisations than nevers, according to Table 3, their apparent optimism could be due to 
rational learning. If this were the case, futures should not have significantly higher 
expectations than nevers. The final two columns of Table 4 are OLS expectation equations 
with employment status dummies but no rational expectations control.20 As futures do have 
significantly higher expectations, it can be concluded that their optimism is not down to 
rational learning.  
 
 Previous studies have found that the self-employed are more optimistic about their 
financial prospects than employees. Our key finding is that their optimism predates their 
entry into self-employment. The financial optimism of the self employed is therefore not 
(entirely) a consequence of being self-employed but in some measure a dispositional trait. 
 
																																								 																				
19 Due to the categorical data, rational expectations do not imply that the coefficient on the fitted values is unity. 
An increase in expected performance may not justify any increase in the most likely outcome or a large change.  
20 For most variables the coefficients in these equations are similar to the expectation without the performance 
control. This reflects the low coefficient on the performance control and the relatively small performance 
differences. Expectation differences are a good measure of optimism but this can only be determined by doing 
the two-stage exercise. 
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People who later become self-employed display more optimism whilst still in paid 
employment than those who never become self-employed. Those who express an aspiration to 
start a business are also more optimistic.  
 
 The next important issue is how optimism changes as people move in and out of self-
employment. From Table 4 column 2, entrants to self-employment, the self-employed, those 
leaving self-employment and employees who have been self-employed in the past are all 
significantly more optimistic than nevers. That returners to paid employment are more 
optimistic is again evidence that intrinsic optimism is a factor in self-employment. Switchers-
in are more optimistic than futures but the difference is not significant, possibly because there 
are relatively few entrant observations. Selfs are more optimistic than futures at the 5% level.  
There is some evidence that the financial optimism of futures is greater when they are self-
employed. Although it has been ruled out that the relative optimism of futures is entirely due 
to learning effects, to the extent they are present, the effect of self-employment on optimisms 
is underestimated.  
 
 Overall, it seems that people who actually become self employed in the future or 
express a desire to do so are more optimistic concerning their financial prospects than those 
who remain in paid employment and are happy to do so. The most obvious explanation 
follows de Meza and Southey (1996). Optimists are attracted by activities that encourage 
optimism. For example, individual i's expected return in activity 9 is )&: = ;&<=>= where ;& 	is 
an index of I’s optimism, <= the optimism “capacity” of occupation 9 and >= is the true return. 
Defining ?:@ as the difference in the expected return to two activities, 9 and A, 
BCDEF
BGHBIJ
= >=	 >
0. Optimists are relatively attracted by the activity with the greatest optimism capacity. This 
potentially explains why optimism is higher for futures but it implies that their optimism 
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would become greater still when they become self-employed. As noted, there is some 
evidence that this is the case. 
 
 In this analysis optimism matters only because it influences the perception of 
economic variables. It is possible that optimism is associated with other personality traits that 
involve a taste for self-employment. Consider ‘sensation seeking’ defined by Zukerman 
(1994) as “a trait defined by the need for varied, novel, and complex sensations and 
experiences and the willingness to take physical and social risks for the sake of such 
experiences.” (p.27) A taste for novelty may be associated with a propensity to give self-
employment a go. Nicolaou et al (2008) find that this characteristic is heritable and 
entrepreneurs are indeed more likely to have it. In addition, Horvath and Zuckerman (1993) 
show that sensation seekers underestimate risk. So there is the possibility that the optimism of 
the self-employed is not a cause of optimism but a side product of the true driver, sensation 
seeking. This could be why the financial optimism of the self-employed is not detectably 
higher than when they were in paid employment. Some suggestive evidence is that sensation 
seekers tend to be smokers (Zuckerman, Ball, Black (1990)) and using the BHPS data, we 
found a strong positive correlation between smoking and financial optimism. 
 
 Whether or not sensation seeking plays a role in explaining the relation between 
optimism and self-employment, the finding that optimism precedes self-employment has 
important efficiency implications. Entry due to financial misperception depends on the 
difference in the optimism applied to paid and self-employment and that is certainly less than 
cross section estimates suggest. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
 This paper finds evidence that the self-employed overestimated their short-run 
financial prospects even when they were employees. Relative to equally well performing 
workers who remain in paid employment, employees who go on to become self-employed the 
proportion forecasting they will be be better off may be some 20% per cent higher. This is 
strong evidence that the dispositional optimism of the self-employed is higher. Consistently 
with this view, employees who aspire to start their own business are of above average 
financial optimism. As the desire to start a business is expressed prior to the measurement of 
optimism, the explanation cannot be rational learning.  
 
 Although the self-employed are not more optimistic merely by virtue of being self-
employed, it does not follow that optimism is a cause of self-employment. This requires that 
optimists (mistakenly) expect to gain financially from switching to self-employment which in 
turn involves greater realism concerning prospective earnings in paid employment than in 
self-employment. There are a priori reasons for thinking the scope for wishful thinking 
concerning how well a new business will do is greater than when contemplating the returns to 
continuing in paid employment. Natural optimists are the most likely to be prone to such bias, 
so it is plausible that a track record of optimism in paid employment predicts future self-
employment.  We find some evidence that that people are even more optimistic when they are 
self employed than when employees indicating a direct effect of optimism on choice.  
 
To the extent that optimism affects the assessment of the returns to both paid and self 
employment, the optimism bias may not give rise to such distorted entry decisions as may 
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initially appear.21 So, although optimism may be a persistent characteristic of aspiring or 
intending entrepreneurs, even ignoring externalities, it may not be one that causes much 
mistaken entry. Although the results on whether self-employment increases optimism are not 
clear cut, what is unequivocal is that cross-section comparisons of the optimism of employees 
and the self-employed exaggerate the extent of the error. In this context, two wrongs do tend 
to make a right. 
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Appendix  
 
 Alternative methods of comparing the optimism of the various groups are reviewed 
here and the corresponding estimates presented. All find that futures are significantly more 
optimistic than nevers but evidence that the optimism of futures changes when they enter 
self-employment is weaker.  
 
 A natural procedure is to separately estimate the expectation and realisation equations. 
If the group of interest have significantly higher expectations but lower realisations it is more 
optimistic. Call this method M1. The problem is that unless it can be ruled out that the 
realizations of the high expectation group are not better no conclusion can be drawn. This is 
due to the categorical data. If in one group everyone correctly estimates the probabilities of 
worse is 40% and the others as 30% each, they all forecast worse. In another group the 
probabilities of better is 40% with the other outcomes 30% each, so all forecast better. The 
expected outcomes only differ by 0.2, but the expectations by 2. At first sight, the second 
group is more optimistic, but this is an artefact of the categorical data.  
 
 To see whether the combinations that allow conclusions to be drawn apply in this data 
(augmented to include subjects not observed in paid employment), pooled probit realization 
and expectation regressions including employment status dummies are run. Table A1 reports 
the result. A one-tailed test rejects that futures have better realisations. As the expectation 
equation shows that futures have higher expectations, it can be concluded that they are more 
optimistic than nevers. For aspires and other groups, M1 is not applicable. 
 
 The second method, M2, involves the construction of forecast errors. Forecasts and 
realizations are coded on a three point scale thereby creating a five point forecast error scale. 
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As discussed in the text, there is a potential truncation error if the group found to be more 
optimistic has better realizations. From Table A2a this property does not apply to futures 
relative to nevers so the very significant difference between these two groups in Table A2b 
can be taken at face value. Aspires do not have significantly different realizations to non-
aspires (Table A1). It therefore cannot be ruled out that the relative optimism of the aspires 
in Table A2a is due to truncation bias. 
  
 A third method, M3, estimates realization conditional on forecast, controls and group 
dummies with nevers the excluded group. If every group was equally optimistic the 
distribution of outcomes would be the same given the forecast, so if a dummy is significantly 
negative, that group is relatively optimistic. M3 estimates realization conditional on forecast 
whereas the text method, M4, estimates forecast conditional on rational expectation. These 
procedures are not of equal power. Consider an extreme illustration. Suppose that everyone 
basis expectations on irrelevant factors. So there is no correlation between forecasts and 
realizations. Nevertheless futures have higher expectations than nevers, but there is no 
significant difference between the groups in the determination of realizations. In this case M4 
finds that given expected realization, futures have higher expectations; so are more 
optimistic. In contrast, M3 wrongly concludes there is no difference in optimism between the 
groups. Although futures are more likely to forecast better, whichever group such a forecast 
comes from, there will be no difference in the expected outcome. So M3 is a less direct and 
reliable estimator of optimism than M4.22 Nevertheless, Tables A3a and A3b show that  
																																								 																				
22 Suppose that the expectation formation process is )&' = ;&L((&' , 3&') where 3&' are factors unrelated to 
rational expectations and ;& 	is an optimism index. If two groups have the same distribution of (&' and 	3&' but 
differ in their distribution of optimism then M4 measures the difference in mean  ;. The mean change in R 
required to preserve ) when optimism is higher (what M3 measures) depends on the nature of the L function 
and the joint distribution of ( and 3 so will not necessarily equal the mean difference in ;. Consider the 
following stylised example. Subjects must decide whether they are a G or B. knowing there are equal numbers 
of both types in the population. A ball is drawn with your letter on it but it's hard to read. An unbiased expert is 
hired to decipher the letter. An assessment is written specifying the most likely letter that is correct 75% of the 
time. A realist accepts the report’s conclusion. A super optimist reviews the reports and converts Bs to Gs. So 
29	
	
futures are significantly more optimistic than nevers and aspires more optimistic than non-
aspires. 
  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
for the optimist, 50% of claimed Gs really are. This is not so different to the realist’s 50%. If the expert is 
always right optimism causes the accuracy of the forecast to fall from 100% to 50% but if the expert is no better 
than random optimism has no effect on the forecast conditional outcome. 
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics 
    Aspires Non-Aspires 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Financial forecasts and 
realizations 
     
Financial forecast (t):      
 Better off Reference category 0.473 0.499 0.342 0.474 
 Same  0.450 0.498 0.581 0.493 
 Worse off  0.077 0.267 0.077 0.266 
 3 point scale  
 (dependent variable) 
-1 if individual financial forecast 
‘worse off’, 0 if ‘same’ and 1 if 
‘better off’ at t 0.396 0.627 0.265 0.590 
Financial realization 
(t+1): 
 
    
 Better off Reference category 0.392 0.488 0.340 0.474 
 Same   0.366 0.482 0.456 0.498 
 Worse off  0.242 0.428 0.204 0.403 
 3 point scale  
 (dependent variable) 
-1 if individual realised ‘worse 
off’, 0 if ‘same’ and 1 if ‘better 
off’ at t+1 0.150 0.782 0.136 0.725 
Financial realization 
(t): 
 
    
 Better off Reference category 0.407 0.491 0.380 0.485 
 Same   0.365 0.481 0.440 0.496 
 Worse off  0.229 0.420 0.180 0.384 
 3 point scale  
 
-1 if individual realised ‘worse 
off’, 0 if ‘same’ and 1 if ‘better 
off’ at t 0.178 0.777 0.199 0.721 
Forecast error:      
  5 point scale 
 (dependent variable) 
Range from  -2 to +2 (Forecast t  
minus Realization  t+1) 0.246 0.897 0.129 0.815 
 
Demographics      
 Age Years 35.59 10.42 39.46 12.14 
 Age squared  1375.2 786.8 1704.7 1001.5 
 Male  0.628 0.483 0.472 0.499 
Marital Status      
 Married  0.486 0.500 0.582 0.493 
 Cohabiting  0.233 0.423 0.163 0.370 
 Widowed/divorced 
 /separated 
 
0.075 0.263 0.079 0.270 
 Single, never married Reference category 
0.206 0.404 0.175 0.380 
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Educational Attainment      
 University degree  0.181 0.385 0.181 0.385 
 Other higher education  0.092 0.289 0.077 0.267 
 A-levels  0.223 0.417 0.224 0.417 
 O-Levels/GCSE's  0.378 0.485 0.364 0.481 
 No qualifications Reference category 0.126 0.332 0.154 0.361 
N 
 
3688 28237 
 
Source: authors tabulations from BHPS 1991-2008 
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Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics 
  Nevers Futures Switchers In Selfs Switchers Out Pasts 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Financial forecasts 
and realizations 
             
Financial forecast 
(t): 
             
 Better off Reference 
category 0.340 0.474 0.418 0.493 0.428 0.495 0.411 0.492 0.433 0.496 0.351 0.477 
 Same  0.559 0.496 0.479 0.500 0.466 0.499 0.525 0.499 0.492 0.500 0.575 0.494 
 Worse off  0.101 0.301 0.103 0.304 0.106 0.308 0.064 0.245 0.075 0.263 0.074 0.262 
 3 point scale  
 (dependent 
variable) 
-1 if individual 
financial forecast 
‘worse off’, 0 if 
‘same’ and 1 if 
‘better off’ at t 0.239 0.619 0.315 0.649 0.322 0.657 0.347 0.596 0.358 0.617 0.276 0.591 
Financial 
realization (t+1): 
 
            
 Better off Reference 
category 0.334 0.472 0.366 0.482 0.374 0.484 0.308 0.462 0.391 0.488 0.320 0.467 
 Same   0.433 0.495 0.368 0.482 0.349 0.477 0.475 0.499 0.417 0.493 0.466 0.499 
 Worse off  0.233 0.423 0.266 0.442 0.277 0.448 0.216 0.412 0.192 0.394 0.214 0.410 
 3 point scale  
 (dependent 
variable) 
-1 if individual 
realised ‘worse 
off’, 0 if ‘same’ 
and 1 if ‘better 
off’ at t+1 0.102 0.746 0.099 0.789 0.097 0.802 0.092 0.718 0.199 0.738 0.106 0.723 
Financial 
realization (t): 
 
            
 Better off Reference 
category 0.366 0.482 0.414 0.493 0.331 0.471 0.347 0.476 0.321 0.467 0.360 0.480 
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 Same   0.424 0.494 0.351 0.477 0.424 0.495 0.443 0.497 0.417 0.493 0.460 0.498 
 Worse off  0.210 0.407 0.235 0.424 0.245 0.430 0.210 0.407 0.262 0.440 0.180 0.385 
 3 point scale  
 
-1 if individual 
realised ‘worse 
off’, 0 if ‘same’ 
and 1 if ‘better 
off’ at t+1 0.157 0.743 0.179 0.785 0.086 0.754 0.137 0.734 0.059 0.762 0.180 0.713 
Forecast error:              
  5 point scale 
 (dependent 
variable) 
Range from  -2 to 
+2 (Forecast t  
minus Realisation  
t+1) 0.138 0.837 0.216 0.900 0.225 0.905 0.254 0.834 0.160 0.865 0.171 0.845 
Demographics              
 Age Years 38.4 12.1 35.1 10.4 37.7 11.2 43.7 11.8 40.9 11.5 43.2 11.3 
 Age squared  1619.2 984.0 1340.5 772.4 1546.6 897.0 2048.3 1075.0 1801.7 998.8 1990.8 1035.8 
 Male  0.467 0.499 0.606 0.489 0.637 0.481 0.671 0.470 0.632 0.483 0.639 0.480 
Marital Status              
 Married  0.589 0.492 0.541 0.498 0.568 0.496 0.663 0.473 0.640 0.480 0.693 0.461 
 Cohabiting  0.144 0.351 0.170 0.376 0.203 0.403 0.134 0.341 0.168 0.374 0.137 0.344 
 
Widowed/divorced 
 /separated 
 
0.079 0.270 0.056 0.231 0.067 0.249 0.076 0.264 0.070 0.255 0.084 0.278 
 Single, never 
married 
Reference 
category 0.188 0.391 0.233 0.423 0.162 0.369 0.127 0.333 0.122 0.328 0.085 0.280 
Educational 
Attainment 
 
            
 University degree  0.154 0.361 0.198 0.399 0.203 0.403 0.165 0.371 0.199 0.399 0.173 0.378 
 Other higher 
education 
 
0.075 0.264 0.091 0.287 0.079 0.270 0.074 0.261 0.098 0.297 0.091 0.287 
 A-levels  0.205 0.404 0.237 0.425 0.219 0.414 0.251 0.434 0.239 0.427 0.228 0.420 
 O-Levels/GCSE's  0.373 0.484 0.306 0.461 0.326 0.469 0.305 0.461 0.309 0.463 0.337 0.473 
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 No qualifications Reference 
category 0.192 0.394 0.168 0.374 0.173 0.378 0.206 0.404 0.155 0.362 0.171 0.377 
N   51999 3700 556 2911 614 2422 
 
Source: authors tabulations from BHPS 1991-2008 
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Table 2: Fixed Effect Linear probability regression for financial realizations (first stage 
equation) 
 
(1) 
Realization
s t+1  
(2) 
Realizations 
t+1  
Variable Coefficient P>z Coefficient P>z 
Aspires -0.011 0.529 - - 
Switchers In - - -0.019 0.608 
Selfs - - 0.060 0.024 
Switchers Out - - 0.159 0.000 
Pasts - - 0.079 0.014 
Demographics      
Age  0.003 0.895 0.019 0.184 
Financial Realizations time t 
(reference category: ‘better’)     
‘Same’ 0.044 0.000 -0.046 0.000 
‘Worse’ 0.111 0.000 -0.053 0.000 
Observations 31925  62202  
F test  
(p-value) 
22.12  
0.000  
15.57  
0.000  
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables 
(coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic 
below 0.05 
Table 3: Linear probability regression of fixed effects from Stage 1 (Table 2) 
 
(1*) 
Fixed Effects from (1) 
(2*) 
Fixed Effects from (2) 
Variable Coefficient P>z Coefficient P>z 
Aspires 0.0318 0.004 - - 
Nevers - - 0.0648 0.000 
Observations 31925 62202 
Chi
2
 8.29 18.72 
(p-value) 0.004 0.000 
Adjusted R
2
 0.000 0.002 
Root MSE 0.458 0.511 
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered by individual. Italic indicates 
significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table 4: Linear probability regression for financial forecasts conditional on predicted realizations (second stage equation) 
 
(1)  
Forecast t  
(2)  
Forecast t  
(3)  
Forecast 
t  
(4)  
Forecast 
t  
Variable Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Predicted financial realizations at t+1 0.260 0.000 0.313 0.000 - - - - 
Aspires 0.072 0.000 - - 0.069 0.000 - - 
Futures - - 0.050 0.001 - - 0.042 0.005 
Switchers In - - 0.078 0.009 - - 0.074 0.006 
Selfs - - 0.145 0.000 - - 0.148 0.000 
Switchers Out - - 0.099 0.000 - - 0.132 0.000 
Pasts - - 0.063 0.000 - - 0.064 0.000 
Demographics  
    
    
Age  -0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.011 0.000 
Male 0.044 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.043 0.000 
Marital Status  
    
    
Married -0.045 0.002 -0.035 0.003 -0.052 0.000 -0.036 0.001 
Couple 0.002 0.834 0.033 0.003 0.005 0.735 0.035 0.002 
Widowed/divorced/separated -0.006 0.770 0.010 0.490 -0.012 0.524 0.002 0.906 
Educational Attainment  
    
    
University -0.032 0.013 -0.044 0.000 -0.011 0.475 -0.014 0.271 
HND/HNC -0.050 0.019 -0.035 0.014 -0.033 0.092 -0.015 0.354 
A-level -0.024 0.100 -0.030 0.008 -0.018 0.228 -0.022 0.070 
O-levels/GCSEs 0.000 0.977 -0.004 0.718 0.001 0.920 -0.001 0.952 
Financial Realizations time t 
(reference category: ‘better’) 
    
    
‘Same’ -0.140 0.000 -0.136 0.000 -0.198 0.000 -0.206 0.000 
‘Worse’ 0.008 0.503 -0.026 0.001 -0.095 0.000 -0.157 0.000 
Observations 31925  62202   31925  62202 
F-Test 
 
 
 
  138.57  156.74 
Chi
2
  4587.59   16422.99      
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(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2 
0.125  0.133   0.096  0.105 
Root MSE 0.558  0.577   0.567  0.587 
	
Note:  Columns (1) and (2) report standard errors that are bootstrapped and  clustered by individual. Columns (3) and (4) report clustered 
standard errors. All regressions include year dummy variables (coefficients not reported).  Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 
0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Appendix 
Table A1a: Ordered probit regression for financial realizations measured at time t+1 
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Aspires -0.024 0.280 -0.009 0.278 0.002 0.259 0.007 0.284 
Demographics          
Age  -0.005 0.227 -0.002 0.227 0.000 0.227 0.001 0.227 
Age squared/100 -0.0049 0.271 -0.0018 0.271 0.0004 0.272 0.0014 0.271 
Male 0.048 0.001 0.018 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.013 0.001 
Marital Status          
Married -0.076 0.002 -0.028 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.021 0.002 
Couple -0.003 0.909 -0.001 0.909 0.000 0.908 0.001 0.909 
Widowed/divorced/separated -0.060 0.073 -0.022 0.070 0.005 0.042 0.017 0.079 
Educational Attainment          
University 0.131 0.000 0.049 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.035 0.000 
HND/HNC 0.092 0.003 0.034 0.004 -0.010 0.010 -0.025 0.002 
A-level 0.035 0.149 0.013 0.150 -0.003 0.166 -0.010 0.145 
O-levels/GCSEs 0.007 0.733 0.003 0.733 -0.001 0.734 -0.002 0.733 
Financial Realizations time t (reference category: ‘better’)         
‘Same’ -0.357 0.000 -0.129 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.101 0.000 
‘Worse’ -0.632 0.000 -0.207 0.000 0.005 0.025 0.202 0.000 
Cut 1 -1.426        
Cut 2 -0.166        
Log Likelihood -32538.1     
chi²  (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.033        
N 31925        
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables (coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level 
(p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A1b: Ordered probit regression for financial realizations measured at time t+1 
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Futures -0.040 0.074 -0.014 0.071 0.002 0.041 0.012 0.078 
Switchers In -0.027 0.567 -0.010 0.565 0.002 0.531 0.008 0.571 
Selfs 0.022 0.188 0.008 0.190 -0.001 0.211 -0.007 0.185 
Switchers Out 0.123 0.001 0.045 0.002 -0.011 0.012 -0.035 0.001 
Pasts 0.051 0.014 0.019 0.015 -0.004 0.028 -0.015 0.012 
Demographics          
Age  -0.011 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Age squared/100 0.0010 0.722 0.0004 0.722 -0.0001 0.722 -0.0003 0.722 
Male 0.032 0.003 0.012 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.010 0.003 
Marital Status          
Married -0.043 0.010 -0.015 0.010 0.003 0.013 0.013 0.010 
Couple 0.018 0.315 0.007 0.317 -0.001 0.334 -0.005 0.313 
Widowed/divorced/separated -0.050 0.033 -0.018 0.031 0.003 0.012 0.015 0.035 
Educational Attainment          
University 0.152 0.000 0.056 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.043 0.000 
HND/HNC 0.078 0.001 0.029 0.001 -0.006 0.003 -0.023 0.000 
A-level 0.044 0.009 0.016 0.009 -0.003 0.015 -0.013 0.008 
O-levels/GCSEs 0.012 0.403 0.004 0.403 -0.001 0.408 -0.004 0.402 
Financial Realizations time t (reference category:  ‘better’)         
‘Same’ -0.358 0.000 -0.127 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.109 0.000 
‘Worse’ -0.666 0.000 -0.214 0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.223 0.000 
Cut 1 -1.231        
Cut 2 -0.015        
Log Likelihood -70459.3       
chi²  (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.040        
N 68659        
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Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables (coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level 
(p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A1c: Ordered probit regression for financial forecasts measured at time t 
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Aspires 0.145 0.000 0.055 0.000 -0.038 0.000 -0.017 0.000 
Demographics          
Age  -0.038 0.000 -0.014 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.000 
Age squared/100 0.021 0.000 0.008 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
Male 0.105 0.000 0.039 0.000 -0.026 0.000 -0.013 0.000 
Marital Status          
Married -0.078 0.013 -0.029 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.010 0.012 
Couple 0.028 0.376 0.010 0.377 -0.007 0.382 -0.004 0.370 
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.000 0.994 0.000 0.994 0.000 0.994 0.000 0.994 
Educational Attainment          
University -0.011 0.728 -0.004 0.728 0.003 0.727 0.001 0.730 
HND/HNC -0.059 0.143 -0.022 0.138 0.014 0.128 0.008 0.158 
A-level -0.031 0.311 -0.011 0.309 0.007 0.305 0.004 0.318 
O-levels/GCSEs 0.011 0.674 0.004 0.674 -0.003 0.675 -0.001 0.673 
Financial Realizations time t (reference category: ‘better’)         
‘Same’ -0.399 0.000 -0.145 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.054 0.000 
‘Worse’ -0.197 0.000 -0.071 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.028 0.000 
Cut 1 -2.831        
Cut 2 -0.935        
Log Likelihood -26722.7       
chi²  (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.057        
N 31925        
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables (coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level 
(p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A1d: Ordered probit regression for financial forecasts measured at time t  
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Futures 0.085 0.005 0.031 0.006 -0.019 0.008 -0.012 0.003 
Switchers In 0.170 0.000 0.064 0.001 -0.041 0.001 -0.023 0.000 
Selfs 0.236 0.000 0.089 0.000 -0.058 0.000 -0.032 0.000 
Switchers Out 0.260 0.000 0.099 0.000 -0.066 0.000 -0.033 0.000 
Pasts 0.162 0.000 0.061 0.000 -0.039 0.000 -0.022 0.000 
Demographics          
Age  -0.033 0.000 -0.012 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 
Age squared/100 0.0141 0.000 0.0052 0.000 -0.0030 0.000 -0.0022 0.000 
Male 0.077 0.000 0.028 0.000 -0.016 0.000 -0.012 0.000 
Marital Status          
Married -0.057 0.012 -0.021 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.012 
Couple 0.084 0.000 0.031 0.000 -0.019 0.001 -0.012 0.000 
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.030 0.333 0.011 0.335 -0.007 0.343 -0.004 0.324 
Educational Attainment          
University -0.015 0.540 -0.006 0.539 0.003 0.536 0.002 0.543 
HND/HNC -0.014 0.644 -0.005 0.644 0.003 0.641 0.002 0.647 
A-level -0.038 0.092 -0.014 0.090 0.008 0.085 0.006 0.097 
O-levels/GCSEs 0.000 0.984 0.000 0.984 0.000 0.984 0.000 0.984 
Financial Realizations time t (reference category:  ‘better’)         
‘Same’ -0.411 0.000 -0.148 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.066 0.000 
‘Worse’ -0.330 0.000 -0.116 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.057 0.000 
Cut 1 -2.628        
Cut 2 -0.832        
Log Likelihood -59554.8       
chi²  (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.059        
N 68659        
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Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables (coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level 
(p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A2a: Ordered probit regression for forecast errors (M2) 
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(2) P>z 
MFX 
(1) P>z 
MFX 
(0 ) P>z 
MFX (-
1 ) P>z 
MFX  (-
2 ) P>z 
Aspires 0.109 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.024 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.024 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
Demographics              
Age  -0.0201 0.000 
-
0.0024 0.000 
-
0.0044 0.000 0.0014 0.000 0.0046 0.000 0.0007 0.000 
Age squared/100 0.0173 0.000 0.0020 0.000 0.0038 0.000 -0.0012 0.000 -0.0039 0.000 -0.0006 0.000 
Male 0.027 0.051 0.003 0.051 0.006 0.051 -0.002 0.052 -0.006 0.051 -0.001 0.051 
Marital Status              
Married 0.017 0.472 0.002 0.471 0.004 0.472 -0.001 0.468 -0.004 0.472 -0.001 0.473 
Couple 0.024 0.326 0.003 0.332 0.005 0.327 -0.002 0.348 -0.005 0.324 -0.001 0.318 
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.054 0.092 0.007 0.104 0.012 0.092 -0.004 0.133 -0.012 0.087 -0.002 0.077 
Educational Attainment              
University -0.115 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.025 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.005 0.000 
HND/HNC -0.116 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.025 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.005 0.001 
A-level -0.052 0.024 -0.006 0.021 -0.011 0.024 0.003 0.013 0.012 0.026 0.002 0.030 
O-levels/GCSEs -0.001 0.950 0.000 0.950 0.000 0.950 0.000 0.950 0.000 0.950 0.000 0.950 
Financial  Realizations time t (reference category: ‘better’)             
‘Same’ 0.039 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.007 -0.003 0.007 -0.009 0.007 -0.001 0.007 
‘Worse’ 0.393 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.084 0.000 -0.048 0.000 -0.081 0.000 -0.011 0.000 
Cut 1 -2.548            
Cut 2 -1.275            
Cut 3 0.217            
Cut 4 1.193            
Log Likelihood -38131.5          
chi²  (p-value) 0.000            
Pseudo R² 0.011            
N 31925            
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables (coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold 
italic below 0.05 
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Table A2b: Ordered probit regression for forecast errors (M2) 
 
Variable 
Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(2) 
P>z 
MFX 
(1) 
P>z 
MFX 
(0) 
P>z 
MFX (-
1) 
P>z 
MFX (-
2) 
P>z 
Futures 0.086 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.019 0.000 -0.008 0.001 -0.019 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
Switchers In 0.129 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.028 0.003 -0.013 0.020 -0.028 0.002 -0.005 0.001 
Selfs 0.135 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.029 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.029 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
Switchers Out 0.064 0.081 0.008 0.096 0.014 0.081 -0.006 0.129 -0.014 0.075 -0.003 0.062 
Pasts 0.062 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.014 0.003 -0.005 0.009 -0.014 0.003 -0.002 0.002 
Demographics              
Age  -0.013 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Age squared/100 0.0083 0.004 0.0010 0.004 0.0018 0.004 -0.0006 0.004 -0.0019 0.004 -0.0003 0.004 
Male 0.023 0.028 0.003 0.028 0.005 0.027 -0.002 0.028 -0.005 0.028 -0.001 0.028 
Marital Status              
Married 0.000 0.978 0.000 0.978 0.000 0.978 0.000 0.978 0.000 0.978 0.000 0.978 
Couple 0.041 0.019 0.005 0.022 0.009 0.019 -0.003 0.029 -0.009 0.018 -0.002 0.016 
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.062 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.006 -0.005 0.015 -0.014 0.005 -0.002 0.004 
Educational Attainment             
University -0.134 0.000 -0.015 0.000 -0.029 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.006 0.000 
HND/HNC -0.076 0.001 -0.009 0.000 -0.017 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.017 0.001 0.003 0.002 
A-level -0.062 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.014 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.000 
O-levels/GCSEs -0.011 0.421 -0.001 0.420 -0.002 0.421 0.001 0.417 0.003 0.421 0.000 0.423 
Financial Realizations time t 
(reference category: ‘better’)             
‘Same’ 0.027 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.002 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.007 
‘Worse’ 0.326 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.070 0.000 -0.037 0.000 -0.068 0.000 -0.011 0.000 
Cut 1 -2.544            
Cut 2 -1.324            
Cut 3 0.124            
Cut 4 1.105            
Log Likelihood -83630.6            
chi²  (p-value) 0.000            
Pseudo R² 0.010            
N 68659            
  
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables (coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold 
italic below 0.05 
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Table A3a: Ordered probit regression for realizations, conditional on forecasts (M3) 
 
Dependent Variable: Realizations t+1     
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse
) P>z 
Aspires -0.048 0.031 -0.017 0.030 0.004 0.019 0.013 0.034 
Demographics          
Age  0.0004 0.909 0.0002 0.909 0.0000 0.909 -0.0001 0.909 
Age squared/100 -0.0001 0.115 0.0000 0.115 0.0000 0.116 0.0000 0.115 
Male 0.032 0.024 0.012 0.024 -0.003 0.025 -0.009 0.024 
Marital Status          
Married -0.064 0.009 -0.023 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.009 
Couple -0.009 0.731 -0.003 0.731 0.001 0.728 0.002 0.732 
Widowed/divorce
d/separated -0.061 0.062 -0.022 0.059 0.005 0.034 0.017 0.068 
Educational 
Attainment          
University 0.146 0.000 0.054 0.000 -0.016 0.000 -0.038 0.000 
HND/HNC 0.109 0.000 0.041 0.000 -0.012 0.002 -0.029 0.000 
A-level 0.045 0.050 0.017 0.052 -0.004 0.063 -0.012 0.048 
O-levels/GCSEs 0.007 0.736 0.003 0.736 -0.001 0.737 -0.002 0.736 
Financial 
Forecasts time t 
(reference 
category: ‘better’   
      
‘Same’  -0.340 0.000 -0.125 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.091 0.000 
‘Worse’  -0.901 0.000 -0.257 0.000 -0.054 0.000 0.311 0.000 
Financial  
Realisations time 
t (reference 
category: ‘better’)         
‘Same’  -0.298 0.000 -0.107 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.083 0.000 
‘Worse’  -0.600 0.000 -0.197 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.188 0.000 
Cut 1 -1.509        
Cut 2 -0.217        
Log Likelihood -31873.0        
chi² (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.053        
N 31925               
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables 
(coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic 
below 0.05 
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Table A3b: Ordered probit regression for realizations, conditional on forecasts (M3) 
 
Dependent Variable: Realizations t+1     
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse
) P>z 
Futures -0.057 0.010 -0.020 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.017 0.011 
Switchers In -0.058 0.223 -0.020 0.216 0.003 0.123 0.017 0.232 
Selfs -0.023 0.165 -0.008 0.163 0.001 0.141 0.007 0.168 
Switchers Out 0.076 0.049 0.028 0.053 -0.006 0.096 -0.022 0.042 
Pasts 0.021 0.303 0.008 0.305 -0.001 0.328 -0.006 0.299 
Demographics          
Age  -0.006 0.016 -0.002 0.016 0.000 0.016 0.002 0.016 
Age squared/100 -0.0003 0.908 -0.0001 0.908 0.0002 0.908 0.0001 0.908 
Male 0.020 0.050 0.007 0.050 -0.001 0.050 -0.006 0.050 
Marital Status          
Married -0.033 0.041 -0.012 0.042 0.002 0.046 0.010 0.041 
Couple 0.002 0.898 0.001 0.898 0.000 0.899 -0.001 0.898 
Widowed/divorce
d/separated -0.056 0.014 -0.020 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.017 0.015 
Educational 
Attainment          
University 0.165 0.000 0.061 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.046 0.000 
HND/HNC 0.085 0.000 0.031 0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.024 0.000 
A-level 0.054 0.001 0.019 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.016 0.001 
O-levels/GCSEs 0.012 0.368 0.004 0.369 -0.001 0.374 -0.004 0.368 
Financial 
Forecasts time t 
(reference 
category: ‘better’   
      
‘Same’  -0.337 0.000 -0.121 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.097 0.000 
‘Worse’  -0.830 0.000 -0.239 0.000 -0.054 0.000 0.293 0.000 
Financial  
Realisations time 
t (reference 
category: ‘better’)         
‘Same’  -0.294 0.000 -0.104 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.088 0.000 
‘Worse’  -0.611 0.000 -0.197 0.000 -0.004 0.023 0.201 0.000 
Cut 1 -1.315        
Cut 2 -0.069        
Log Likelihood -69074.9       
chi² (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.059        
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N 68659        
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables 
(coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic 
below 0.05. 
